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1 Introduction
The U.S. Great Depression has attracted enormous economics research interest because of its
mysterious, abrupt, dramatic and persistent downswings in almost all the important economic
indicators. Economists traditionally look for the explanations from many perspectives such as
rigid wages or prices, monetary restriction, financial turbulence, and comprehensive and intense
fiscal or regulatory overhauls. Although none of them turn out to be fully responsible for the
most severe recession in the U.S. history, the financial channel (”not just the financial shocks”)
has been considered a favorite area to reveal the answers to all the puzzles, especially after the
innovative works by Ben Bernanke1. It has been quite well accepted that ”financial collapse is
more than a symptom of economic decline.” Much research has been devoted to establishing a
connection between financial sector unease and real sector sloppiness in the U.S. Great Depres-
sion as well as investigating how financial concerns affected the decision of different agents. The
study of the indebted business or household has won an extraordinary place among all these efforts.
The following are some prominent papers in this direction2: Fisher (1933) for the first time
switches our focus to the debt market. He suggests that the liquidation debt selling in an over-
indebted environment could trigger a nationwide deflation, as the dramatic decrease in outstanding
loans reduces the velocity of money circulation. The fall of the general price level might lead to
a significant loss in production, employment and net-worth, which would further reinforce the
motivation for liquidation selling and therefore cause another round of liquidation debt selling.
The worst scenario is ”the very effort of individuals to lessen their burden of debts increases
it, because of the mass effect of stampede to liquidate in swelling each dollar owed”, namely a
debt-deflation cycle. Frederic Mishikin shows that theories of consumer expenditures can postulate
a link between household balance-sheet change and decrease of aggregate consumption in the
1930s. Mishkin (1978) exposits that the nondurable consumption could be reduced by the decline
1In 1980s, he wrote a series of papers exploring the impact of financial factors during the U.S. Great Depression.
Most importantly, Bernanke (1983) argues that debt deflation and simultaneous sales of financial assets hurt the
balance-sheet of banks or financial institutions and make them either fail or tighten their credit supply. In the
presence of financial market imperfection, which makes professional financial intermediaries the only ones to allocate
capital efficiently, the destruction of financial intermediaries could reduce investment and production.
2A more comprehensive survey by Calomiris (1993) provides the summaries and comments on almost every article
about the financial factors and the US Great Depression.
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of household net-worth according to the permanent income hypothesis, while durable consumption
could be suppressed by the households’ demand on liquidity3. Yet it is far from a well accomplished
mission to understand the impact of debt during the U.S. Great Depression. There are still many
aspects for successors to fill in. First, Fisher (1933) and Mishkin (1978) focus on the decline of
output, working hours, net-worth, and consumption, and omit the business investment collapse;
Second, most of the early papers about financial factors during the U.S. Great Depression rest
their conclusions loosely on proposed theories and fail to offer structural models for quantitative
analysis. Third, the existing theories lack a deeper and closer examination of the corporate bond
market despite the fact that the corporate bond market actually experienced the same significant
catastrophe and, more importantly, interacted with the real economy. Giesecke et al. (2011) shows
that two corporate bond default peaks occurred during the 1930s and that the one between 1931
and 1935 was the second worst in the last 150 years. Hunter (1982) shows that the spending
stream of large firms was drained away during the U.S. Great Depression because they had to raise
liquidity in anticipation of a perceived default risk in the future; Hart and Mehrling (1995) proposes
a hypothesis: ”When a decline is under way, business men whose debts fall due in the visible future
are obliged to do their best to remain liquid, which holds down business volume”. In the meantime,
the default risk is also found by Miao and Wang (2010) to be a powerful tool to understand the
business cycles in a more general framework and wider time range. My paper is to improve on the
above three fields, that is to build a well-parameterized quantitative structural model and shed
some light on the relationship between business investment collapse and corporate bond default risk.
This paper builds a rational expectation DSGE model subject to the TFP and financial
shock4. There are three agents: entrepreneurs, firms and workers. Entrepreneurs own the
firms. Firms own the production capital and technology, rent labor and issue bonds. Workers
buy bonds and supply labor. A credit shock identical and independent over firms and time
hits the firms each period and randomly generates a financial expenditure proportional to their
capital stock. Before making the investment and issuing new bonds, firms determine whether
to default on their debt obligation after observing credit and financial shocks. Upon default
3This mechanism is named ”Liquidity Hypothesis” and discussed in details by Mishkin (1976).
4There are various ways to model and measure the financial shocks. The one I implement here is proposed by
Perri and Quadrini (2011) and Jermann and Quadrini (2012).
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they redeem the ownership of their firms through costly negotiation and restructure process
and continue their operation. After calibrating the model to the long-run economic facts of
the U.S. economy and feeding the actual TFP and financial shock series into simulation, the
quantitative results demonstrate that the adverse technology shocks could be tremendously
aggravated by the default pressure on the corporate sector. On the one hand, the massive wave
of corporate bond defaults directly idled a considerable amount of capital, which was detrimental
to production, investment and employment. On the other hand, the indebted firms were inclined
to cut more investment during the economic downturn, as they were also concerned about the
increasing default risk besides the awful economic outlook. Besides, the default recovery rate
decline caused by the financial turbulence fails to explain economic aggregates downswings well,
but does contribute greatly to the awful risky corporate bond yield. More interestingly, the
climbing of debt-capital ratio seems beyond the best interest of firms. It is a possible factor to
deteriorate the recession. My model setups are basically built on Cooley and Quadrini (2001)
and Miao and Wang (2010). Because the main focus of this paper is macroeconomic fluctuation,
some specific features matching firm cross-sectional distribution and financial structure are elimi-
nated while some additional properties are introduced. However, their key mechanism stays similar.
Finally, I want to remind readers that this paper does not intend to address the source or
the nature of adverse technology and financial shocks during the U.S. Great Depression or to
attribute the economic downturn completely to the firm default risk. Instead, I’m more interested
in the following questions: how are these shocks propagated and amplified by the default risk
and quantitatively how much of economic contraction, especially the investment decline, can be
explained by this channel? My quantitative practice is restricted to the corporate sector. It does
not mean that the mechanism proposed here is just within the corporate sector. It is because
I have access only to the corporate data. The paper is organized as below: Section 2 presents
the model; Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium properties; Section 4 introduces the data and
parametrization; Section 5 illustrates the quantitative results and also provides some discussion.
The final part concludes.
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2 Model
I consider an infinite-horizon and discrete-time economy. Three types of agents live forever:
entrepreneurs, workers and firms. Entrepreneurs exclusively own the firms. Firms have the pro-
duction capital and technologies in this economy. They rent labor from workers and issue long-term
bonds. Workers earn labor income from wages and receive bond payment. The detailed features of
each agent are discussed in the following subsections.
2.1 Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs do not provide labor supply in this economy. Their problem is as follows:
max
{cet ,sjt+1}
∞∑
t=0
βt
cet
1−ν
1− ν (1)
subject to: cet +
∑
pjts
j
t+1 ≤
∑
(pjt + d
j
t )s
j
t
cet is the consumption of entrepreneurs at period t. s
j
t represents entrepreneurs’ share holdings of
firm j. pjt and d
j
t respectively stands for the share price and dividend of firm j. The first order
conditions with respect to sjt+1 is:
β
(
cet+1
cet
)−ν
=
pjt
pjt+1 + d
j
t+1
(2)
Entrepreneurs are homogeneous. Therefore the value of sjt equals to unity at equilibrium. Namely
the representative entrepreneur possesses all the firms at the same time. Thus it is easy to get
cet =
∑
djt at equilibrium. Define Dt =
∑
djt . Then c
e
t = Dt. Consequently, the first order
condition can be transferred into:
β
(
Dt+1
Dt
)−ν
=
V jt − djt
V jt+1
(3)
and
V jt = d
j
t + β
(
Dt+1
Dt
)−ν
V jt+1 (4)
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where V jt is the firm value including the dividend payout. Therefore the discount factor for firms
is β
(
Dt+1
Dt
)−ν
.
2.2 Firms
The value of firm j at period t is given by V (kjt , b
j
t , z
j
t ;At, t). k
j
t , b
j
t ,and z
j
t are the individual
state variables and respectively stand for the capital stock, outstanding debt and credit risk. At
and t are the aggregate TFP and financial shocks. Firms decide to default on their long-term bond
if and only if V˜ (kjt , b
j
t , z
j
t ;At, t) < 0. Equation (5) shows that the firm value equals to 0 if default
and otherwise V˜ (kjt , b
j
t , z
j
t ;At, t). The bellman equation (6) defines V˜ (k
j
t , b
j
t , z
j
t ;At, t). It consists
of three parts: operating profit pi(kjt , z
j
t ;At), debt payment −(1−λ)ϑbjt −λbjt and continuing value
J(kjt , b
j
t ;At, t). I assume a multiple-period long-term debt setup following Leland. (1994): 1/λ
represents the terms to maturity; Firms pay back only λ of their outstanding debt and get charged
a coupon payment at the rate ϑ over the remaining 1− λ each period.
V (kjt , b
j
t , z
j
t ;At, t) = max{0, V˜ (kjt , bjt , zjt ;At, t)} (5)
V˜ (kjt , b
j
t , z
j
t ;At, t) = pi(k
j
t , z
j
t ;At)− (1− λ)ϑbjt − λbjt + J(kjt , bjt ;At, t) (6)
pi(kjt , z
j
t ;At) = max
hjt
{F (At, kjt , hjt )− wthjt − zjt kjt } = (Rt − zjt )kjt (7)
J(kjt , b
j
t ;At, t) = max{kjt+1,bjt+1}
{qt[bjt+1−(1−λ)bjt ]−xjt−Γ(kjt+1, bjt+1)+Et
βU ′(dt+1)
U ′(dt)
V (kjt+1, b
j
t+1, z
j
t+1;At+1, t+1)}
subject to: kjt+1 = (1− δ)kjt + Ψk
(
xjt
kjt
)
kjt (8)
djt = (Rt − zjt )kjt − λbjt + qt∆bjt − xjt − Γ(kjt+1, bjt+1) (9)
F (kt, nt) = A
T
t k
θ
t n
1−θ
t (10)
The operating profit pi(kjt , z
j
t ) is a intra-period optimization problem given the aggregate
price and state variables. It is affected by the exogenous stochastic credit risk zjt , which can
be considered as the financial cost relevant to the short-term (intra-period) finance that is not
captured by this model explicitly. It is possible to solve for the labor demand of firms njt first
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and convert the maximization format of pi(kjt , z
j
t ) into a regular function as in equation (7) if I
employ the homogeneity property of the Cobb-Douglas production. Rt is the marginal return
to the capital. It is also a function of kt/nt as the wage rate wt and also identical for different
firms as a result. If firms decide not to default, they immediately issue new long-term bond
qt[b
j
t+1 − (1 − λ)bjt ] and make investment xt. Γ(kjt+1, bjt+1) represents the financial cost, including
the transaction commission and financial position adjustment cost5. The expected firm value next
period is discounted with entrepreneurs’ inter-temporal marginal rate of substitute in dividend
payout β
(
Dt+1
Dt
)−ν
. The feature of equation (8) is taken from Jermann (1998). The adjustment
cost Ψk(it) is increasing and concave.
Because firms default if and only if V˜ (kjt , b
j
t , z
j
t ;At, t) < 0, the solution for the following equation
(11) is the default trigger. If and only if the realization of zt is larger than z˜t, the optimal choice
for the entrepreneurs is to claim default. In consequence the default probability is Pr{zt > z˜t}.
(Rt − z¯t)kjt − bjt [(1− λ)ϑ+ λ] + J(kjt , bjt ) = 0 (11)
Furthermore recall that the firm value V (kjt , b
j
t , z
j
t ;At, t) is 0 upon default and V˜ (k
j
t , b
j
t , z
j
t ;At, t)
otherwise. The above information can help reduce the expected firm value next period.
EtV (k
j
t+1, b
j
t+1, z
j
t+1) =
∫ zmax
z˜jt+1
0dΦ(z) +
∫ z˜jt+1
zmin
V˜ (kjt+1, b
j
t+1, z
j
t+1)dΦ(z)
= kjt+1
∫ z˜jt+1
zmin
(z˜jt+1 − z)dΦ(z)
(12)
where Φ(z) is the CDF of random variable z.
5The detailed specification of financial cost and capital adjustment cost are discussed in the later subsection when
the model is transferred into a solution-friendly format.
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2.3 Workers
Workers have a instantaneous utility U(ct, nt) = log(ct) +η log(1−nt) as in King et al. (1988)6.
Their discount factor over time γ is assumed to be larger than the one of entrepreneurs β, which
implies that workers are more patient and therefore ask for a lower return on their savings. This
is the reason why entrepreneurs borrow from workers at equilibrium. Wage earnings wtnt, bond
payment and financial service fees are their income sources. Their asset pricing kernel and labor
supply are listed below:
Pricing kernel:
Λwt =
1
cwt
(13)
Labor supply:
wt
cwt
=
η
1− nt (14)
cwt is the consumption of workers. The workers consider the default risk when they determine the
bond price. There are two possible scenarios for each bond bjt+1: On the one hand, firms j can
fulfill the obligation with a probability Φ(z˜t+1), that is λ of the outstanding debt retires and 1− λ
stays circulating in the market and only pays the coupon payment; On the other hand, it default
with a probability 1−Φ(z˜t+1). Under the circumstances of default, workers claim all the operating
profit and takeover the ownership of the firms temporarily. After they reduce the debt level to tbt
through negotiation with creditors, firms are going to redeem their ownership and restore another
round of operation. The negotiation and restructure process brings cost and cut the capital equal
to (1− )kt7. Therefore the initial state of the restructured firm j is (tkjt , bjt ) and corresponding
continuing value is J(tkt+1, tbt+1). The no arbitrage condition ensures the following bond price
6They find that U(ct, Lt) =
cιtυ(Lt)
1−ι can capture the stylized facts of U.S. business cycles under particular as-
sumptions, where Lt is leisure and equals to 1−Nt. Specifically, υ need to be increasing and concave if 0 ≤ ι < 1; υ
need to be decreasing and convex if ι > 1; υ need to be increasing and concave if ι = 1, that’s the utility function in
the same logarithm form as in this paper.
7This assumption is to obtain a unchanged leverage ratio for the convenience of computation. We will discuss
this issue later in the transformation and optimization subsection.
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determination equation:
qtbt+1 = γ
Λwt+1
Λwt
[
bt+1[λ+ (1− λ)(ϑ+ qt+1)]Φ(z˜t+1) +
∫ zmax
z˜t+1
pit+1 + J(kt+1, bt+1)dΦ(z)
]
(15)
where Λwt+1 is the pricing kernel of workers. Note the second term on the righthand side could not
be directly multiplied by 1− Φ(z˜jt+1) as pi(kjt+1, zjt+1) is a function of z¯jt+1.
2.4 Transformation and Optimization
As Miao and Wang (2010) shows, the model with the above features satisfies the linear homo-
geneity. Namely all the equations still hold if they are divided by the same non-zero value, say
kjt . Such mathematical manipulation decreases the dimension of state space in the original model.
I follow the same procedures they suggest and reduce the individual state set from {kjt , bjt , zjt } to
{$jt , zjt }, where $t = bt/kt. Besides, all the firms in this economy indeed face the same problem so
I just eliminate the superscript j from now on for convenience. The trigger value z˜t determination
equation is now:
Rt − z˜t −$t[(1− λ)ϑ+ λ] + J($t) = 0 (16)
and the continuing operation value determination is into:
J($t) = max{$t+1,it}
{qt[$t+1g(it)− (1− λ)$t]− it − Γ($t+1)g(it)
+ Etβ
(
Dt
Dt+1
)ν
g(it)
∫ z˜t+1
zmin
(z˜t+1 − z)dΦ(z)}
(17)
where
g(it) = 1− δ + Ψk(it), and it = xt
kt
Again,the financial cost Γ($t+1) includes the commission and financial position adjustment cost.
The former one is proportional to the market value of the outstanding long-term debt while the
latter one is just the cost to push debt-capital ratio to deviate from the steady state as in Miao
and Wang (2010).
Γ($t+1) = ψqt$t+1 +
($t+1 − $¯)2
2
(18)
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I also assume a capital adjustment cost in the following format:
Ψk(it) =
i¯α
1− αi
1−α
t −
αi¯
1− α (19)
where i¯ is the steady state investment-capital ratio. After transforming the individual firm problem,
it is straightforward that the key for the firm optimization is to search for the optimal debt-capital
ratio $t+1 and investment rate it to maximize the value of function J($t), because the first two
terms in the equation (6) are either predetermined or exogenous. Then the necessary condition
with respect to it is:
1
g′(it)
=
Debt Capital
Capital︷ ︸︸ ︷
qt$t+1 +Etβ
(
Dt
Dt+1
)ν ∫ z˜t+1
zmin
(z˜t+1 − zt+1)dΦ(z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Equity Value
Capital
−Γ($t+1) (20)
The term on the on the left-hand side of equation (20) can be considered as the inverse of
∆kt+1/∆xt, which represents the marginal transformation rate of investment into the capital and
therefore the marginal cost to increase one extra unit of capital. It equals to 1 if there was no
capital adjustment. In addition, the first term on the right-hand side is the debt value over capital,
the second term is the equity value over capital, and the last term is the financial cost. The first
two term together work as the ratio between the firm market value and the corresponding capital.
Therefore the right-hand side is a modified Tobin’s Q. Note, the transformation rate of investment
to capital changes as the investment-capital ratio changes in the presence of the capital adjustment
cost. Therefore the entrepreneurs would like to adjust it until the transform rate equal to the
marginal Tobin’s Q. It is interesting to do some qualitative conjecture here. If my model here is
correctly set up, the debt price and equity value should both go down as the default risk increases.
If there is no large movement of outstanding debt in the opposite direction, then the consequent
decline of Tobin’s Q on the right-hand side drives down the investment capital rate on the left-hand
side as g(it) is concave. This mechanism is at the core of this paper in explaining the investment
dynamics.
qt = Etβ
(
Dt
Dt+1
)ν
Φ(z¯t+1)
∂z¯t+1
∂$t+1
+ Ψ′b($t+1)−
∂qt
∂$t+1
[$t+1(1− ψ)− (1− λ) $t
g(it)
] (21)
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The equation (21) indicates the entrepreneurs’ optimal choice in the debt-capital ratio and pro-
vides the fundamental for the financial structure decision. The left-hand side is all the benefit
entrepreneurs could obtain from increasing a marginal unit of debt-capital ratio, that’s the sale
price of bonds, while the right-hand side offers the cost to increase a marginal unit of debt-capital
ratio, including the present value of payment contingent on the non-default case, the marginal
financial cost and the price fluctuation caused by the financial position change. It appears impossi-
ble to obtain any immediate qualitative results directly from the observation of equation (21) as a
result of its complexity. So the dynamics of debt-capital movement under the current framework is
a quantitative issue, which I will give a more detailed discussion in the quantitative result section.
2.4.1 Aggregate the Economy
The market clearing conditions in this model are nontrivial because of the heterogeneity among
firms. The default firms and non-default firms make investment and financial decision according
to identical decision rules but on different capital states. Specifically the default firms reorganize
their assets and continue operation using only  of their previous capital. Besides, I assume all the
firms are heterogeneous only in their capital and debt size rather their debt-capital ratio. Thus the
aggregate investment Xt, the aggregate capital next period Kt+1, capital accumulation equation,
aggregate debt Bt+1 and goods market clearing condition are:
Xt = (Φ(z¯t) + [1− Φ(z¯t)]t) itKt (22)
Kt+1 = g(it)(Φ(z¯) + [1− Φ(z¯)]t)Kt (23)
Bt+1 = $t+1Kt+1 (24)
Yt = c
w
t + c
e
t +Xt (25)
Yt = AtK
θ
t n
1−θ
t (26)
Note I assume the production process happens before the default process. It does not receive any
impact from the default. The capital used in production is Kt. The production function is the
classic Cobb-Douglas function, where ATt is the technology shock that follows a vector autoregressive
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process in (27) together with t. At
t
 = Ω
At−1
t−1
+
εa,t
ε,t
 (27)
3 Data and Calibration
The data in this paper are all annual. One period in the model hence corresponds to one
year in reality. Although the standard calibration is usually in the quarterly frequency, mine is a
compromise because of the shortage in consistent quarterly data series during the inter-war era.
Most of parameters are obtained by calibrating to the long-term U.S. macroeconomic facts. The
others are taken from relevant literatures. The data series to abstract the long-term targets range
from 1929 to 19768. The following session summarize the calibration strategy. The concrete data
sources are offered in the Appendix.
[Table 1 about here.]
The parameters pinned down by the steady state targets are θ, η and δ. 1− θ is set to equal to
the share of labor relevant expenditure in the total nonfinancial corporate income; As the weight
of leisure in the total utility, η guarantees the daily average working hours equal to 8 hours; δ
is equal to the average of ratio between depreciation of non-residential capital and nonresidential
capital stock of nonfinancial corporation. The relevant data are from National Income and Product
Account of Bureau of Economics Analysis, NIPA henceforth. ν, λ, and  are taken from literatures.
I set the value of ν equal to 5 as in Jermann (1998); 1/λ represents the average years to maturity for
the long-term debt. It is difficult to make any inference about the average years to maturity of U.S.
long-term corporate bond. The recent study shows that the average maturity of long-term corporate
debt in western economy is between 4 and 8.5 years and that the average maturity is pro-cyclical.
Without loss of generalization the average years to maturity I take here is 5 years, namely λ = 0.2. 
is the recovery rate when a corporation files a default. Giesecke et al. (2011) says ”Hickman (1960)
Table 152 implies that the average recovery rate of defaulted issues during the 1900−1944 period is
8Although the data availability and quality are very limited at that time, fortunately it is still possible to impute
all the required data from different sources. Such methodology is certainly plagued by some inconsistences issues but
it is definitely the best I could achieve for now.
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about 62.5%”. The remaining five parameters {β, γ, ψ, α, κ} are respectively the discount factor of
entrepreneurs, the discount factor of workers, the commission rate, capital adjustment parameters
and shape parameters for the distribution of zt. They can not be identified individually. Therefore,
I just let them work together to match five long-term business cycle moments: capital-output ratio,
credit spread between Baa corporate bond and stock, debt-capital ratio, the relative volatility of
investment to output, and the annual accumulative default probability. The cumulative density
function of z is assumed to follow Miao and Wang (2010)
Φ(z) =
(
z +
κ
1 + κ
)κ
z ∈
[
− κ
1 + κ
,
1
1 + κ
]
(28)
[Figure 1 about here.]
This distribution function is supported by the interval [ −κκ+1 ,
κ
κ+1 ] and with the mean equal to 0.s
My calibration successfully make the power format function generate a right-skewed and thin-tail
density. See Figure 1. This feature is very important. Because it can further guarantees that only
very few firms declare default and that a moderate movement of zt around the right tail does not
cause a large change of Φ(z). Solow residual series and the financial shocks series are the data
to estimate the autoregressive system (27). I compute the Solow residual sequence in a standard
approach. Take the log of the output, capital and working hours and derive Aˆt the following
equation:
Aˆt = yˆt − θkˆt − (1− θ)hˆt
For the financial shocks series, I follow the procedures proposed by Jermann and Quadrini (2012),
that’s
t =
GDP
end of period capital− end of period debt
End of period capital is the private fixed assets of nonfinancial firms in NIPA. End of period debt
is the corporate long-term debt in the Historical Statistics of United States. GDP is the total value
added of nonfinancial corporation in NIPA. The working hours sequence is a little complicated.
The series before 1963 is the weekly working hours from Kendrick (1961) and Kendrick (1973).
The series after 1963 is from the BLS private average weekly hours. All the value are in the real
terms and the log values are all linearly detrended before estimation.
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4 Quantitative Analysis
In this section I will present the computation strategy, simulation results and interpretation.
Although the original equation system to characterize the equilibrium has been reduced much by
the variable transformation in section 2, there still exists a large state-space and especially too
many lagged state variables. It is an obstacle for nonlinear methods. Therefore, I solve the model
linearly instead. It is worth pointing out that some endogenous variables take negative values
at steady state. So it is not possible to apply the log-linear scheme. The full equation system
and details to solve for the steady state are given in the Appendix. Once the laws of motion
for state variables and decision rules for the jump variables are obtained, the simulation can be
done by feeding into the model the actual realization of technology and financial shocks from year
1929 to 1939. Then I compare the simulated transition path of economic aggregates and financial
variables with their data counterparts. In the meantime, a standard real business cycle model
with an identical capital adjustment cost and inter-temporal elasticity of substitution is solved and
simulated in the same way in order to identify the amplification by the default risk. The concrete
setup and solution of this benchmark model is also in the Appendix.
4.1 Steady State and Impulse Response
My quantitative analysis starts with the exhibition of the steady state. Two first-order partial
derivatives ∂z˜t∂$t and
∂qt
∂$t+1
are included in my endogenous variable set. ∂z˜t∂$t < 0 implies that a
higher debt-capital ratio decreases z˜t and further increases the default probability. It is quite
intuitive because firms with heavier debt burden are more vulnerable to the default risk. In
addition, the interpretation of ∂qt∂$t < 0 is also very straightforward. The bond price has to go down
when firms are exposed to heavier debt burden and higher default probability. These two features
are both consistent with our observation in the financial market. The impulse response experiments
are also taken around the steady state. The figure 2 and 3 respectively show the dynamics of all
important economic indicators after the negative one-percent technology or financial shock hits
the steady state economy. All the movements have been measured as the percentage deviation
from steady state in the graphs. In Figure (2), the initial deviation of output and investment are
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both larger than the size of the original shock, which implies that the model with default risk is
able to amplify the impact of the technology shock. especially the investment decline is as three
times as the one in technology decline. Consumption shows about the 80% of the decline in the
technology while the working hour is less than the half. The consumption decrease is delayed by
the households’ motive to smooth their utility stream. A large decrease in the working hours does
not occur possibly because the strong wealth effect when the wage drops9. The debt-capital ratio
and capital are both predetermined so their responses start from zero. The capital goes down
for two reason: the default-reorganization cost and lower investment. The default process make
firms lose 47.5% of their capital. Nonetheless, the fraction of the firms under such effect is small.
On the contrary, most of firm would response to the impulse by cutting investment. Compared
with the traditional case without default risk, the default risk emerges as another propeller to
the investment collapse. As the equation (20) shows, both debt price and equity value will go
down deeper because of the increase in probability to default, which finally leads to a more severe
investment decline.
However, it is surprising to find out that the debt-capital ratio is increasing instead of decreasing.
A reasonable explanation is that the total outstanding debt falls more slowly than the capital. It
is definitely not a result of the default process. Because the model assumes that both capital
and outstanding debt will be cut in the same proportion. Therefore the default process cannot
bring down the value of debt-capital ratio. Thus the fall speed discrepancy only comes from
the endogenous choice of entrepreneurs. At steady state the ψk (¯i) = 1, which implies one unit
investment decline can decrease one unit capital decline. However, the saved one unit investment
expenditure isn’t completely used to buy back outstanding bond. Because firms have to pay
financial position adjustment cost and also want to use part of liquidity to smooth their dividend
payout. Therefore the decline of outstanding debt is smaller than one unit.
[Figure 2 about here.]
9The labor income accounts for almost 70% of the total income. The wage rate drop might lead to a strong
negative wealth effect and drive workers not to enjoy too much leisure. In the appendix I conduct a sensitivity
analysis with a different utility function. When I introduce the utility function in Greenwood et al. (1988) and set
the habit formation parameter equal to zero, the wealth effect of wage change is completely eliminated, The working
hours decrease a lot as expected. So it is very reasonable to conjecture that the missing of working hours decline here
is the result of wealth effect.
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The figure 3 illustrates the impulse response to the negative financial shock. All the variables
move in the same direction as they are hit by the negative technology shock except the consumption.
The reason why consumption increases a little bit is that the negative financial shock drives the
investment down but fail to make the same amount decline in the output. Consumption has to
go up. A lower recovery rate makes the entrepreneurs more aware of the default and reduce the
investment to avoid the default loss. The output based on the constant technology level and
slightly changed capital capital won’t lead to a deep downturn. In sum, the impact of financial
shock is quantitatively small. Only the impacts on investment, capital and bond price are relatively
significant but still minor compared with the technology impulse response.
[Figure 3 about here.]
4.2 Simulation
Three simulation experiments are done so that we can recognize the role of different shocks
during the U.S. Great Depression. First, I consider both technology and financial shocks. Figure
4 shows that all the simulated aggregates but working hours generate a transition comparable to
data. It is necessary to emphasize that the consumption I plot here is the consumption of workers
rather than the sum of workers’ consumption and entrepreneurs’ dividend payout, because it is
more aligned with the consumption definition in the traditional literature. The black dashed line
is the simulation results from the benchmark RBC model. It shows that the amplification by the
default risk is large, particularly in investment. The failure in matching working hours should be
attributed to the strong wealth effect that was discussed in the impulse response subsection.
rd =
λ+ (1− λ)ϑ
q
+ 1− λ (29)
In addition, the financial indicators such as the default rate, bond yield and debt-capital ratio are
also within our interest. According to Giesecke et al. (2011), there are two corporate bond default
peaks during the U.S. Great Depression: one is between 1931 and 1934, and the other is between
1937 and 1938. Their standard in measuring the default peaks is that the annual cumulative
default rate is higher than 2%. Thus, my model successfully predicts one of the most worst default
peak between 1931 and 1934. The severity, the highest annual default rate 3%, and timing are
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all acceptable. I fail to reproduce the second one between 1937 and 1938 but the annual default
rate is very close to the 2% line. The bond yield in this model is computed following the equation
(29) and matches well with the middle-grade corporate bond yield from Susan B. Carter (2003).
Unfortunately, the predicted debt-capital ratio is very different from the actual data series. The
simulated transition path completely miss the huge climbing at the beginning of 1930s and instead
produces a slightly decline. It is quite surprising because intuitively firms should deplete their
debt obligation to ensure their solvency. The analysis on the ∂z˜t∂$t and
∂qt
∂$t+1
also says that higher
debt-capital ratio is more likely to put firms in the danger of default. In Hart and Mehrling (1995)
the author mentions that lots of large utility and railway firms stuck to their finance plan before the
financial turbulence and issued massive volumes of long-term debt in 1930. This is an exceptional
behavior during the hard time. Another candidate explanation to the discrepancy between the
data and model is that my model doesn’t capture the debt adjustment cost very accurately and
underestimate the difficulty in adjusting financial position during a serious recession.
[Figure 4 about here.]
Another two experiments are respectively for the financial and technology shocks. From the
simulation figure 6, it is not difficult to figure out that all the economics aggregates and financial
indicators except the bond yield fail to match with the corresponding data if only the financial shock
is considered. However, the results in figure 5 shows that conclusions from two-shock experiments
are well preserved although the severity get slightly reduced. The bond yield is not well consistent
with the actual one. This decompositions clearly demonstrate that the impact of TFP shocks
is dominant and that the impact of financial shocks is minor in match the economic aggregates.
However, the financial shock does help a lot in producing a jump in risky interest.
[Figure 5 about here.]
[Figure 6 about here.]
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5 Conclusion
This paper attempts to investigate the roles of default risk during the U.S. Great Depression.
My rational expectation RBC model shows that the adverse technology shocks can be amplified
very much by the default risk. Intuitively, when the adverse technology shocks hit the economy,
firms become more vulnerable to the credit risk and try to decrease the investment and debt
heavily to maintain in solvency. Therefore the investment could get cut much more than in the
case where the default risk is not considered. The simulation with TFP and financial shocks
successfully explains the large decline in consumption, output and investment and nonetheless
miss the working hours drop because of the strong wealth effect. In the meantime, the financial
indicators such as default rate and bond yield are also very well predicted. The decomposition
of simulation process tells that the effect of technology shocks dominates during the U.S. Great
Depression whereas the financial shocks only play an important role in pushing up the long-term
bond yield. More interestingly, the counterfactual debt-capital ratio could implies that there exists
a serious obstacles for firms to unload their debt burden during the early 1930s, which therefore
could be a important factor to deteriorate the economic recession.
However, the discussion is still far from ending. Jiang (2013) concludes that the adverse financial
shocks could be an important aspect to understand working hours decline if the working capital
or firm liquidity is correctly introduced. Besides, the monetary policy is not a negligible.factor
when we discuss the corporate finance management and debt market. Thus, my future study will
continue in the following directions: (1) to develop a comprehensive model that can incorporate
both default risk and firm liquidity; (2) to introduce the money and cash management into the
current framework.
18
References
[1] Bernanke, B. S. (1983), ‘Nonmonetary effects of the financial crisis in the propagation of the great
depression’, The American Economic Review 73(3), pp. 257–276.
[2] Calomiris, C. W. (1993), ‘Financial factors in the great depression’, Journal of Economic Perspec-
tives 7(2), 61–85.
[3] Cooley, T. F. and Quadrini, V. (2001), ‘Financial markets and firm dynamics’, The American
Economic Review 91(5), pp. 1286–1310.
[4] Fisher, I. (1933), ‘The debt-deflation theory of great depressions’, Econometrica 1(4), pp. 337–357.
[5] Giesecke, K., Longstaff, F. A., Schaefer, S. and Strebulaev, I. (2011), ‘Corporate bond default risk:
A 150-year perspective’, Journal of Financial Economics 102(2), 233 – 250.
[6] Greenwood, J., Hercowitz, Z. and Huffman, G. W. (1988), ‘Investment, capacity utilization, and
the real business cycle’, The American Economic Review 78(3), pp. 402–417.
[7] Hart, A. G. and Mehrling, P. (1995), Debt, Crisis, and Recovery: The 1930s and the 1990s, M E
Sharpe Inc.
[8] Hickman, W. B. (1960), Statistical Measures of Corporate Bond Financing Since 1900, number
hick60-1 in ‘NBER Books’, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[9] Hunter, H. M. (1982), ‘The role of business liquidity during the great depression and afterwards:
Differences between large and small firms’, The Journal of Economic History 42(4), pp. 883–902.
[10] Jermann, U. J. (1998), ‘Asset pricing in production economies’, Journal of Monetary Economics
41(2), 257 – 275.
[11] Jermann, U. and Quadrini, V. (2012), ‘Macroeconomic effects of financial shocks’, American Eco-
nomic Review 102(1), 238–71.
[12] Kendrick, J. W. (1961), Productivity Trends in the United States, number kend61-1 in ‘NBER
Books’, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
19
[13] Kendrick, J. W. (1973), Postwar Productivity Trends in the United States, 1948-1969, number
kend73-1 in ‘NBER Books’, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[14] King, R. G., Plosser, C. I. and Rebelo, S. T. (1988), ‘Production, growth and business cycles : I.
the basic neoclassical model’, Journal of Monetary Economics 21(2-3), 195–232.
[15] Leland., H. (1994), Bond prices, yield spreads, and optimal capital structure with default risk,
Research Program in Finance Working Papers RPF-240, University of California at Berkeley.
[16] Miao, J. and Wang, P. (2010), Credit risk and business cycles, Technical report, Boston University.
[17] Mishkin, F. S. (1976), ‘Illiquidity, consumer durable expenditure, and monetary policy’, The Amer-
ican Economic Review 66(4), pp. 642–654.
[18] Mishkin, F. S. (1978), ‘The household balance sheet and the great depression’, The Journal of
Economic History 38(4), pp. 918–937.
[19] Perri, F. and Quadrini, V. (2011), International recessions, Staff Report 463, Federal Reserve Bank
of Minneapolis.
[20] Susan B. Carter, Scott Sigmund Gartner, M. R. H. A. L. O. R. S. G. W., ed. (2003), Historical
Statistics of United States millenium edition, Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Eco-
nomic History Association.
URL: http://hsus.cambridge.org/HSUSWeb/toc/hsusHome.do
20
A Data
• Nominal nonfinancial corporate capital stock: BEA FA6.1 Line 4
• Real nonfinancial corporate capital stock: BEA FA6.2 Line 3
• Real nonfinancial corporate investment: BEA FA6.8 Line 4
• Nominal nonfinancial corporate capital depreciation: BEA FA6.4 Line 4
• Real nonfinancial corporate capital depreciation: BEA FA6.5 Line4
• Nominal nonfinancial corporate production: BEA NIPA1.14 Line 17
• Real nonfinancial corporate production: BEA NIPA1.14 Line 41
• Nominal nonfinancial corporate long-term debt: Susan B. Carter (2003) data series cj870−889
• U.S. population between 18 and 65: Susan B. Carter (2003) data series Aa125− 144
• U.S. private non-farm total man-hours 1929− 1953: Kendrick (1961)
• U.S. private non-farm total man-hours 1948− 1966: Kendrick (1973)
• U.S average weekly private working hours 1964− 1976: BLS table ID EES00500005
• Nominal durable good consumption and services: BEA NIPA 1.1.5 Line 5 and Line 6
• GDP deflator: BEA NIPA1.1.5 Line 1
• Corporate Cash: Statistics of Income10
• Corporate inventories: Statistics of Income
10see the archive in the links http://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Archive—1934-to-1953-Statistics-of-Income-
Report,-Part-2
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B Mathematics
B.1 All the equations
Rt − z¯t −$t[(1− λ)ϑ+ λ] + J($t) = 0 (30)
− ∂z¯t
∂$t
− [(1− λ)ϑ+ λ] + ∂J($t)
∂$t
= 0 (31)
J($t) = qt[$t+1g(it)−(1−λ)$t]− it+g(it)
[
β
∫ z¯t+1
zmin
(z¯t+1 − z)dΦ(z)− ψqt$t+1 −Ψ($t+1)
]
(32)
∂qt
∂$t+1
[$t+1g(it)−(1−λ)$t−ψ$t+1g(it)]+qtg(it)(1−ψ)+βg(it)Φ(z¯t+1) ∂z¯t+1
∂$t+1
−g(it)Ψ′($t+1) = 0
(33)
∂J($t)
∂$t
= −qt(1− λ) (34)
qt$t+1(1− ψ)g′(it)− 1 + g′(it)β c
e
t
cet+1
∫ z¯t+1
zmin
(z¯t+1 − zt+1)dΦ(z)− g′(it)Ψ($t+1) = 0 (35)
qt$t+1 = Λ
w
t+1{Φ(z¯t+1)qt+1$t+1(1− λ) + [λ+ (1− λ)ϑ]$t+1
− (1− τp)
∫ zmax
z¯t+1
(z − z¯t+1)dΦ(z) + (1− )J($t+1)[1− Φ(z¯t+1)]}
(36)
qt +
∂qt
∂$t+1
$t+1 = Λ
w
t+1{Φ(z¯t+1)qt+1(1− λ) + [λ+ (1− λ)ϑ] + (1− λ)φ(z¯t+1)qt+1$t+1
∂zt+1
∂$t+1
+ (1− τp)(1− Φ(z¯t+1)) ∂z¯t+1
∂$t+1
+ (1− )J($t+1)φ(z¯t+1) ∂zt+1
∂$t+1
− (1− )[1− Φ(z¯t+1)]∂J($t+1)
∂$t+1
}
(37)
Λwt+1 = γ
cwt
cwt+1
(38)
wt
cwt
=
α
1−Ht (39)
Xt = (Φ(z¯t) + [1− Φ(z¯t)]) itKt (40)
Kt+1 = (1− δ + it) (Φ(z¯) + [1− Φ(z¯)])Kt (41)
Bt+1 = $t+1Kt+1 (42)
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Yt = AtK
θ
tH
1−θ
t (43)
Yt = C
w
t + C
e
t +Xt (44)
wt = (1− θ)AtKθtH−θt (45)
Rt = θAtK
θ−1
t H
1−θ
t (46)
Cet =[(1− τp)Rt + τpδ]Kt + τp[(1− qt−1)λ+ (1− λ)ϑ]$tΦ(z¯t)Kt − [λ+ (1− λ)ϑ]$tΦ(z¯t)Kt
+ qt[wt+1g(it)− (1− λ)$t]Φ(z¯t)Kt − itΦ(z¯t)Kt − φqt$t+1g(it)]Φ(z¯t)Kt
+ {qt[$t+1g(it)− (1− λ)$t]− it − φqt$t+1g(it)}(1− Φ(z¯t))Kt
(47)
∫ z¯t+1
zmin
(z¯t+1 − z)dΦ(z)
=z¯t+1
∫ z¯t+1
zmin
dΦ(z)−
∫ z¯t+1
zmin
zdΦ(z)
=z¯t+1Φ(z¯t+1)− zΦ(z)|z¯t+1zmin +
∫ z¯t+1
zmin
Φ(z)dz
=z¯t+1Φ(z¯t+1)− z¯t+1Φ(z¯t+1) +
∫ z¯t+1
zmin
(z +
κ
κ+ 1
)κdz
=
(z¯t+1 +
κ
κ+1)
κ+1
κ+ 1
(1− τp)
∫ zmax
z¯t+1
(z − z¯t+1)dΦ(z)
=(1− τp)[
∫ zmax
z¯t+1
zdΦ(z)−
∫ zmax
z¯t+1
z¯t+1dΦ(z)]
=(1− τp){zΦ(z)|zmaxz¯t+1 −
∫ zmax
z¯t+1
Φ(z)dz − z¯t+1[Φ(zmax)− Φ(zt+1)]}
=(1− τp)[zmax − z¯t+1Φ(z¯t+1)−
∫ zmax
z¯t+1
Φ(z)dz − z¯t+1 + z¯t+1Φ(z¯t+1)]
=(1− τp)[(zmax − z¯t+1)−
∫ zmax
z¯t+1
Φ(z)dz]
=(1− τp)(zmax − z¯t+1)− (1− τp)
(z + κκ+1)
κ+1
κ+ 1
|zmaxz¯t+1
=(1− τp)(zmax − z¯t+1)− (1− τp) 1
κ+ 1
[1− (z¯t+1 + κ
κ+ 1
)κ+1]
=(1− τp)( 1
κ+ 1
− z¯t+1)− (1− τp) 1
κ+ 1
[1− (z¯t+1 + κ
κ+ 1
)κ+1]
=(1− τp)[
(z¯t+1 +
κ
κ+1)
κ+1
κ+ 1
− z¯t+1]
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The unknowns in the above system are {R, z¯, q,$, J, z$, q$, J$, i,Λw, cw, w, h,X,K,B, ce, Y }.
B.2 Solution for the Steady State
−(1− τp) ∂zt
∂$t
+ τp[(1− qt−1)λ+ (1− λ)ϑ]− τpλ$t∂qt−1
∂$t
− [(1− λ)ϑ+ λ] + ∂J($t)
∂$t
= 0
−(1− τp)Ωz + (τp − 1)[λ+ (1− λ)ϑ]− τpqλ− τpλ$tΩq − q(1− λ) = 0
Ωz
q
=
1
1− τp
[
(τp − 1)λ+ (1− λ)ϑ
q
− τpλ− τpλ$Ω
q
q
− (1− λ)
]
Ωz
q
= −λ+ (1− λ)ϑ
q
− τpλ+ (1− λ)
1− τp −
λτp
1− τp
$tΩ
q
q
(48)
qt +
∂qt
∂$t+1
$t+1 = Λ
w
t+1{Φ(z¯t+1)qt+1(1− λ) + [λ+ (1− λ)ϑ] + (1− λ)φ(z¯t+1)qt+1$t+1
∂z¯t+1
∂$t+1
+ (1− τp)(1− Φ(z¯t+1)) ∂z¯t+1
∂$t+1
+ (1− )J($t+1)φ(z¯t+1) ∂zt+1
∂$t+1
− (1− )[1− Φ(z¯t+1)]∂J($t+1)
∂$t+1
}
1
γ
[
1 + Ωq
$
q
]
=
λ+ (1− λ)ϑ
q
+ Φ(z¯)(1− λ)
+ (1− λ)φ(z¯)q$Ω
z
q
+ {(1− τp)[1− Φ(z¯)] + (1− )J($)φ(z¯)}Ω
z
q
+ (1− λ)(1− )[1− Φ(z¯)]
(49)
∂qt
∂$t+1
[$t+1(1− δ + it)− (1− λ)$t] + qt(1− δ + it) + β(1− τp)(1− δ + it)Φ(z¯) ∂z¯t+1
∂$t+1
= 0
Ωq$
$
q
[(1− δ + i)− (1− λ)] + (1− δ + i) + β(1− τp)(1− δ + i)Φ(z¯)Ω
z
q
= 0 (50)
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The linear system can help us solve for
Ωz
q
= −λ+ (1− λ)ϑ
q
− τpλ+ (1− λ)
1− τp −
τpλ
1− τp
$Ωq
q
(51)
1
γ
$Ωq
q
=
λ+ (1− λ)ϑ
q
+ Φ(z¯)(1− λ)− 1
γ
+ (1− λ)(1− )[1− Φ(z¯)]
+ {(1− λ)φ(z¯)$q + (1− τp)[1− Φ(z¯)] + (1− )J(z¯)φ(z¯)}Ω
z
q
(52)
$Ωq
q
[(1− δ + i)− (1− λ)] + (1− δ + i) + β(1− τp)(1− δ + i)Φ(z¯)Ω
z
q
= 0 (53)
within this system three variables {1− δ+ i, q$, J}need to be transformed into the function of z¯ if
possible. With the manipulation of the capital evolution, FOC with respect to i and the definition
of function J , we can obtain their implication.
Transformed this linear system into a more friendly format. Define a = Ω
z
q , b =
λ+(1−λ)ϑ
q and
c = $Ω
q
q . Also
CC1 = −τpλ+ (1− λ)
1− τp (54)
LL1 = − τpλ
1− τp (55)
LL2 =
1
γ
(56)
CC2 = Φ(z¯)(1− λ)− 1
γ
+ (1− λ)(1− )[1− Φ(z¯)] (57)
MM2 = (1− λ)φ(z¯)$q + (1− τp)[1− Φ(z¯)] + (1− )J(z¯)φ(z¯) (58)
LL3 = (1− δ + i)− (1− λ) (59)
CC3 = (1− δ + i) (60)
MM3 = β(1− τp)(1− δ + i)Φ(z¯) (61)
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LL3 = (1− δ + i)− (1− λ) (62)
The original linear system can be put into:
a = −b+ CC1 + LL1c
LL2c = b+ CC2 +MM2a
LL3c+ CC3 +MM3a = 0
The solution to this simplified system can be obtained easily and listed as below:
c =
CC3 +
MM3(CC1+CC2)
1−MM2
LL3 +
MM3(LL1−LL2)
1−MM2
a =
CC1 + CC2 + (LL1 − LL2)c
1−MM2
b = LL2c− CC2 −MM2a
The conditions or equations we might use during solving the linear system:
1− δ + i = 1
Φ(z¯) + [1− Φ(z¯)] (63)
i =
1
Φ(z¯) + [1− Φ(z¯)] − 1 + δ (64)
q$ = 1− β(1− τp)
∫ z¯
zmin
(z¯ − z)dΦ(z) (65)
J = q$[(i+ 1− δ)− (1− λ)]− i+ β(1− τp)(i+ 1− δ)
∫ z¯
zmin
(z¯ − z)dΦ(z) (66)
Φ(z) = (z +
κ
κ+ 1
)κ
(
− κ
κ+ 1
,
1
κ+ 1
)
(67)
φ(z) = κ(z +
κ
κ+ 1
)κ−1 (68)
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Finally, we need a nonlinear equation to solve for the z¯
1
γ
= (1− λ)Φ(z¯) + λ+ (1− λ)ϑ
q
− 1
q$
∫ zmax
z¯
[(1− τp)(z − z¯) + (1− )J(z¯)]dΦ(z) (69)
∫ z¯
zmin
(z¯ − z)dΦ(z) =
∫ z¯
zmin
Φ(z)dz =
(z¯ + κκ+1)
κ+1
κ+ 1
(70)
Continuing on solving for the steady state variables:
(Rt − z¯t)(1− τp) + τp[(1− qt−1)λ$t + (1− λ)ϑ$t + δ]−$t[(1− λ)ϑ+ λ] + J($t) = 0 (71)
(R− z¯)(1− τp) = −τp[(1− q)λ$ + (1− λ)ϑ$ + δ] +$[(1− λ)ϑ+ λ]− J(z¯) (72)
R =
−τp[(1− q)λ$ + (1− λ)ϑ$ + δ] +$[(1− λ)ϑ+ λ]− J(z¯)
1− τp + z¯ (73)
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Table 1: Parameters and Targets
Parameters Targets
θ 0.370 the ratio between labor expenditure and nonfinancial corporate output 0.37
δ 0.063 the ratio between the depreciation and nonfinancial corporation capital 0.24
η 2.170 working hours account for 1/3 of 24 hours
α 0.230 the ratio between st.d of investment and GDP 2.04
β 0.885 the average capital-output ratio 2.00
γ 0.947 the gap between stock return and Baa corporate bond yield 5%
φ 0.050 the ratio between corporate long-term debt and capital 0.48
κ 0.042 accumulative annual default rate 1%
 0.625 historical default recovery ratio 62.5%
λ 0.200 literature 0.20
σa 0.019
σ 0.036
Ω =
[
0.9509 −0.0842
0.0743 0.7757
]
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Figure 1: CDF and PDF of credit risk z
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Figure 2: Impulse response to TFP shocks
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Figure 3: Impulse response to financial shocks
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Figure 4: Counterfactual simulation with two shocks
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Figure 5: Counterfactual simulation with technology shock only
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Figure 6: Counterfactual simulation with financial shock only
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